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Theses on Secularism 
NOMI MAYA STOLZENBERG*
(1) Notwithstanding the notorious difficulty of defining religion1 and 
the consequent effort on the part of jurists and academics to avoid
embracing any particular definition, one model of religion has
dominated modern discourse: religion as conscience.2  Because of the
* Nathan and Lilly Shapell Chair in Law, University of Southern California 
Gould School of Law. 
1. The classic cases pointing out the difficulty of defining religion in American 
law are as follows: Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970); United States v. Seeger, 
380 U.S. 163 (1965); Mozert v. Board of Education, 827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987); 
Smith v. Board of School Commissioners, 827 F.2d 684 (11th Cir. 1987); Africa v.
Pennsylvania, 662 F.2d 1025 (3d Cir. 1982); and Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197 (3d Cir. 
1979).  Literature on the definitional challenge includes the following: FREDERICK MARK
GEDICKS, THE RHETORIC OF CHURCH AND STATE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF RELIGION
CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE (1995); 1 KENT  GREENAWALT, RELIGION AND THE 
CONSTITUTION: FREE EXERCISE AND FAIRNESS 128 (2006); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 826–29 (1978); Jesse H. Choper, Defining “Religion” 
in the First Amendment, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 579; Douglas Laycock, Religious Liberty 
as Liberty, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 313, 329 (1996); Eduardo Peñalver, Note, The 
Concept of Religion, 107 YALE L.J. 791 (1997); and Note, Toward a Constitutional 
Definition of Religion, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1056 (1978). 
2. For evidence of the ubiquity of the assumption that religion is essentially or 
centrally a matter of conscience, see, for example, MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, LIBERTY OF 
CONSCIENCE: IN DEFENSE OF AMERICA’S TRADITION OF RELIGIOUS EQUALITY (2008); 
DAVID A.J. RICHARDS, TOLERATION AND THE CONSTITUTION 61 (1986) (developing an
interpretive theory of the religion clauses based on “[t]he focal significance that 
Jefferson and Madison give to the right to conscience”); JOHN WITTE JR., RELIGION AND
THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERIMENT 41 (2d ed. 2005) (“Liberty of conscience 
was the general solvent used in the early American experiment in religious liberty.”); and 
sources cited in Andrew Koppelman, How Shall I Praise Thee? Brian Leiter on Respect 
for Religion, 47 SAN DIEGO L. REV 961, 967 n.28 (2010).  On the centrality of conscience 
to the Lockean conception of religion, see Ronald Beiner, Three Versions of the Politics 
of Conscience: Hobbes, Spinoza, Locke, 47 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1107, 1120–24 (2010). 
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dominance of this model, alternative views—which either subordinate 
the conscience to other supposedly more fundamental features of
religion or dispense with the psychological apparatus of conscience 
altogether—have been largely submerged in modern political and legal 
discourse.  Yet they will not remain suppressed.  As a number of the 
conference papers here attest,3 alternatives and challenges to the 
dominant model have been surfacing with increasing regularity and 
insistence, particularly in the last decade, in part because the logic of the 
model seems to have exhausted or deconstructed itself, or driven itself 
For the clearest example in this Symposium of a work committed to the assumption that 
religion, as a matter of definition, is centrally a matter of conscience, see Brian Leiter, 
Foundations of Religious Liberty: Toleration or Respect?, 47 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 935,
944–51 (2010). 
3. Michael White and Andrew Koppelman both offer strong arguments against 
exclusive reliance on the conscience model. See Koppelman, supra note 2, at 965–70; 
Michael J. White, The First Amendment’s Religion Clauses: “Freedom of Conscience” 
Versus Institutional Accommodation, 47 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1075, 1080, 1094–1105 
(2010). Although he argues that we ought to replace a model of religion rooted in
individual conscience with an “institutional privilege” approach, Professor White 
recognizes that the conscience model has been, and continues to be, dominant.  White, 
supra, at 1094.  He thus challenges the model’s normative and conceptual dominance but 
recognizes its dominance in legal thought as an empirical fact.  Koppelman disputes the 
primacy accorded to the conscience model on normative and conceptual grounds and
challenges the empirical claim that the conscience model dominates American legal 
thinking about religion. See Koppelman, supra note 2, at 965 (“If Leiter is interested in 
American law, however, conscience is a misleading place to begin.  Some special 
treatment of religion can easily fit under the rubric of conscience; some much less so.”).
Although Koppelman is right to call our attention to the instances in which individuals, 
policymakers, and courts use the term religion in a way that is not reducible to
conscience, and is further correct that these usages demonstrate that our legal and
political institutions, and popular culture, are not beholden exclusively to the conscience
model, I do not think it follows that the conscience model has not been dominant 
historically.  Nor does the fact that alternative models of religion have had some
influence on American legal thought contradict the fact that the conscience model
continues to occupy a privileged place in American law, oftentimes, although not 
always, resulting in the denial of claims rooted in alternative models of religion.  To say 
that the conscience model is or has been dominant is not to say that it has gone 
unchallenged. Professor Koppelman and I share the view that the conscience model 
represents “a radically impoverished conception of what religion is and what religion 
does,” id. at 962, and we further share the view that alternative conceptions of religion, 
ones that contest the centrality of conscience to the definition of religion, occupy an 
important place in the phenomenology and sociology of religious experience.  We
further agree that such alternative models have always afforded a conceptual standpoint 
from which to contest the conscience-based model.  Finally, we also share the view that
alternatives to the conscience-based model have been gaining ground.  There is thus 
much that we agree upon with regard to the inadequacy of the conscience model 
embraced by other writers.  Where we part company is with regard to Koppelman’s 
argument that evidence of the acceptance of alternative views shows that the conscience
model is no longer, or never was, dominant in American legal thought.
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into a corner,4 but also because theoretical rivals to the conception of 
religion as conscience have always existed, have never disappeared, and 
have never stopped pressing their claims.5  Because the conscience
model has seemingly run itself into the ground, leaving constitutional 
discourse about religion at an impasse, it seems that we might finally be 
ready to see the conceptual alternatives and consider their implications 
for policies concerning religious accommodation, freedom, and the 
relationship between religion and the state. 
(2) The contours of the theoretical alternatives to thinking of religion 
as conscience remain fuzzy, but they can be sharpened if we break down 
the component features of the dominant model with more precision. 
What the conscience model leaves out is, of course, directly, inversely 
related to what it rules in, so a precise inventory of what is ruled into the 
model can help us to get a handle on the conceptual alternatives.  That
inventory begins, and ends, with the psychological faculty of human
cognition. 
While there are various ways of conceiving what “conscience” is, for 
example, Thomist versus Protestant versus secular conceptions,6 and 
varying views about whether conscience is a strictly “religious” faculty 
or whether it encompasses nonreligious beliefs as well,7 what all 
conceptions that picture religion as conscience have in common is the
fundamental assumption that religion is a species of belief.8 More 
precisely, conscience is viewed as a “faculty” of the human psyche,
4. For analyses of the contemporary doctrinal predicament and impasse, see
Koppelman, supra note 2, at 960–70; White, supra note 3, at 1080, 1083, 1092. 
5. Accord Koppelman, supra note 2, at 963–67; see also Steven D. Smith, The
Tenuous Case for Conscience, 10 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 325 (2005). 
6. On Protestant and Thomist conceptions, see White, supra note 3, at 1077–80, 
1094–96. 
7. On the debate over whether religion is “special” or no different from other
beliefs for purposes of constitutional treatment, see, for example, STEVEN D. SMITH, 
FOREORDAINED FAILURE: THE QUEST FOR A CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLE OF RELIGIOUS 
FREEDOM (1995); Kent Greenawalt, The Significance of Conscience, 47 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 901, 909–16 (2010); Andrew Koppelman, Is It Fair To Give Religion Special
Treatment?, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 571, 585, 591; Andrew Koppelman, No Expressly
Religious Orthodoxy: A Response to Steven D. Smith, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 729, 735
(2003); Michael W. McConnell, The Problem of Singling Out Religion, 50 DEPAUL L.
REV. 1, 12–14 (2000); Michael J. Perry, From Religious Freedom to Moral Freedom, 47
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 993, 1011–13 (2010); White, supra note 3, at 1083.  See also
NUSSBAUM, supra note 2, at 19–20, 102; Beiner, supra note 2, at 1109; Leiter, supra
note 2, at 944–45, 950–51. 
8. Accord Koppelman, supra note 2, at 970–73. 
 1043


















    
 
  





    
  
  
   
     
     
  
 
through which an individual’s beliefs or judgments—about moral or 
metaphysical truth or ultimate questions of meaning—are formed, 
discerned, or held. 
To think of religion as a matter of holding beliefs is to place religion 
on the plane of human knowledge and thus to link it to age-old debates 
about the psychology of cognition and the philosophy of knowledge— 
debates about the nature of truth and the objectivity of truth claims.  The 
concept of conscience both responds to and finesses these epistemological 
debates by adopting a “subjectivist” view that treats as religion whatever
the individual happens to believe in—qua religion.9  Because it “brackets
the truth claim,” neither affirming nor denying the truth of the beliefs a 
believer happens to hold, focusing instead on whatever the believer
believes to be religious dogma, truth, or religion tout court,10 this
subjectivist perspective is consistent with both philosophical realism and
constructivist views of human knowledge and truth claims.  Likewise, it 
is perfectly compatible with modern-day materialist views of religion
that regard particular religious belief systems as cultural constructions 
and religion in general as an “anthropological projection.”11  But it is 
equally at home with faith traditions that are humble about the fallibility
of human knowledge and alert to the human capacities for projection and
self-deception while still maintaining faith in the possible or actual
9. See Nomi Maya Stolzenberg, Jiminy Cricket: A Commentary on Professor 
Hill’s Four Conceptions of Conscience, in  INTEGRITY AND CONSCIENCE 53, 55–57 (Ian 
Shapiro & Robert Adams eds., 1998) [hereinafter Stolzenberg, Jiminy Cricket: A
Commentary]. On subjectivism, see also Nomi Maya Stolzenberg, “He Drew a Circle
that Shut Me Out”: Assimilation, Indoctrination, and the Paradox of a Liberal 
Education, 106 HARV. L. REV. 582, 626–34, 640–41 (1993) [hereinafter Stolzenberg, He 
Drew a Circle]. Cf. Beiner, supra note 2, at 1108 (quoting Letter from Rousseau to 
Voltaire (Aug. 18, 1756), in 3 THE COLLECTED WRITINGS OF ROUSSEAU 108, 119 (Roger 
D. Masters & Christopher Kelly eds., Judith R. Bush et al. trans., 1992)) (describing 
Hobbes’s, Spinoza’s, and Locke’s views of religion as an inner judgment of mind
“where demonstration has no place”).
10. See Stolzenberg, He Drew a Circle, supra note 9, at 626 (quoting Vincent P. 
Branick, The Attractiveness of Fundamentalism, in  FUNDAMENTALISM TODAY: WHAT
MAKES IT SO ATTRACTIVE? 21, 23–24 (Marla J. Selvidge ed., 1984)). 
11. For classic expressions of the materialist/anthropological view, see, for
example, PASCAL BOYER, RELIGION EXPLAINED: THE EVOLUTIONARY ORIGINS OF
RELIGIOUS THOUGHT 32 (2001); EMILE DURKHEIM, THE ELEMENTARY FORMS OF THE 
RELIGIOUS LIFE 22 (Joseph Ward Swain trans., 1915); LUDWIG FEUERBACH, THE 
ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY at xl (George Eliot trans., 1957); SIGMUND FREUD, MOSES AND
MONOTHEISM 133–34 (Katherine Jones ed., 1951) (1932); SIGMUND FREUD, THE FUTURE
OF AN ILLUSION 18 (James Strachey ed. & trans., 1961) (1928); CLIFFORD GEERTZ, 
Religion as a Cultural System, in THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES 87 (1973).  For an
early adumbration of the anthropological view, see BARUCH SPINOZA, THEOLOGICAL-
POLITICAL TREATISE at xxxv–xxxvi, 36–48 (Samuel Shirley trans., 1991) (1925). 
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existence of a divine truth, being(s), or realm.12  Because it is
“nondenominational,” it is easy to think that this cognitive-subjectivist 
approach to religion is truly “ecumenical” and avoids the sectarianism
that infects more specific definitions of religion found within particular 
faith traditions.  Indeed, because of its ecumenical aspirations, combined
with its actual dominance, it can be hard to see that it is dominant and 
that there are rival views, which (a) contradict the stated aspiration
for a suitably neutral, unbiased way of identifying religion and
(b) generate different views about the policies regarding religious
freedom, accommodation, and the separation of religion and state.  But, 
regardless of whether religion is deemed to be “special,” or no different
from nonreligious beliefs,13 determining which belief systems are eligible
for accommodation, support, or freedom from regulation requires making
some assumptions about what religion is, or of what it is a species.  And 
amongst the most fundamental of such assumptions is the view that
religion is a species of individual belief.
The idea that religion is creed—in essence, a set of cognitive 
propositions that individual adherents of faith more or less consciously
hold—is so deeply embedded in our legal culture that it can be hard to 
see it as a particular, debatable view of what religion is.  But there have 
always been other ways of understanding religion that do not define it 
wholly or primarily in terms of its members’ cognitive beliefs.  What 
follows is an effort to get a better of grasp of these noncreedal,
noncognitivist views and to see how these alternative models of religion 
are excluded or distorted by the cognitive model of religion as 
conscience, if only to better appreciate what the consequences of that
exclusion and distortion are.14 
12. See, e.g., Ronald R. Garet, To Secure the Blessings (USC Law Legal Studies 
Research Paper No. 10-11, 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=1645526. 
13. See supra note 7.
14. To attend to these exclusionary and distorting effects is not to deny the utility
of the conscience model in certain—indeed many—contexts.  The idea of religion as 
conscience captures an important aspect of religious experience, the centrality of which 
in modern religious life, and earlier chapters of religious history as well, cannot be 
denied.  The point here is not that the conscience model fails to capture this important
aspect of religious life or that the conscience model should never be followed, but rather 
that it is not the exclusive reality of religious experience and, therefore, failing to 
recognize other ways of conceptualizing religion, and other forms of religious experience, is
problematic. 
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(3) The most obvious feature of the cognitive conception of religion is 
its inward nature, the fact that it resides within the recesses of the
individual human mind.  The preeminence of this feature is reflected in 
contemporary debates over whether religion is special and to be treated
differently from nonreligious beliefs.  The widely shared assumption, 
held by people on both sides of the specialness debate, is that the larger
category into which religion is, or is not, to be subsumed, is that of 
belief—perhaps narrowed to moral belief but belief nonetheless.15  More
than that, the assumption is that the beliefs we are talking about when we
talk about religion are beliefs held by the individual, beliefs that dwell 
within the individual mind. 
This picture of religion as an essentially psychological, subjective, and 
inward affair, an affair of the cognitive mind, is connected to not just 
one but three dichotomies, each of which plays an important role in
structuring the idea of religion as conscience.  Students of religious 
conscience have long been aware of the relevance to their topic of two of 
these dichotomies: first, that between the realm of inner human experience
and the realm of outward human experience and behavior, a dichotomy
commonly if somewhat misleadingly referred to as the belief-practice or
belief-conduct distinction; second, that between subjective psychological
perceptions and objective transcendental reality.16  The inward realm of 
the psyche can be contrasted both with an outer realm of earthly human
behavior and with a transcendental realm of supra-human being or law, 
and both of these distinctions are implicit in the dominant, psychological
model of religion.
There is also a third dichotomy that plays an important role in
structuring our understanding of what the conscience is—the dichotomy 
between rationalist and nonrationalist conceptions of human psychology. 
Rationalist conceptions of psychology are ones that single out the 
psychological faculty of reason as the faculty that forms judgments and 
beliefs.  Rationalist conceptions of the human psyche diverge from rival 
psychological views that see the process of belief formation as driven
not by reason, or not by reason alone, but rather, by the nonrational 
aspects or “faculties” of the human psyche.  Depending on the era and
15. For examples of writers who argue against the specialness of religion while 
subscribing to the model of religion as a realm of belief, see, for example, Leiter, supra
note 2, at 944–45, 950–51; Perry, supra note 7, at 996, 1011–12.  For an example of
writers on the prospecialness side of the debate, who subscribe to the same model, see,
for example, Greenawalt, supra note 7, at 909–17. 
16. On the belief-conduct distinction, see, for example, Christopher L. Eisgruber & 
Lawrence G. Sager, The Vulnerability of Conscience: The Constitutional Basis for 
Protecting Religious Conduct, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1245 (1994). 
1046
STOLZENBERG FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 12/6/2010 8:47 AM     
   











   





   
  
 
   
  
 
   
 
   
  
[VOL. 47:  1041, 2010] Theses on Secularism
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
the particular theory, these nonrational faculties have been variously
conceptualized as emotions, the passions, the appetites, animal instincts,
or drives.  In the more modern scientific idiom of cognitive psychology, 
they are the “affective” rather than cognitive sides of the human psyche.17 
In a more traditional religious idiom, they are either vices, such as lust,
greed, or gluttony, or virtuous expressions of “the spirit.” 
This dichotomy between rationalist and romanticist conceptions of the 
human psyche, familiar from debates over the Enlightenment,18 plays an
important role in our conception of religion as conscience.  But the 
precise nature of that role is elusive.  The dominant model of religion is 
perfectly aligned with neither the rationalist nor romantic side of the 
rationalist/romanticist dichotomy.  Instead, ambivalence regarding this 
dichotomy is built into the very concept of “belief”—belief in general
and religious belief in particular.  From one point of view, beliefs are 
regarded as a product of the exercise of human reason; from another 
point of view, beliefs are seen as the very antithesis of reason—as when
17. In the field of cognitive psychology, the idea that the affective parts of the 
human psyche predominate over the strictly rational intellectual faculties in the
production of beliefs has produced the idea of “bounded rationality,” an idea that has 
been picked up with gusto in the emergent field of behavioral economics.  For the classic 
works on bounded rationality, see generally HERBERT SIMON, ECONOMICS, BOUNDED
RATIONALITY AND THE COGNITIVE REVOLUTION (Massimo Egidi & Robin Marris eds.,
1992); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the 
Psychology of Choice, 211 SCI. (n.s.) 453 (1981).  See also Daniel Kahneman et al., 
Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem, 98 J. POL. ECON. 
1325, 1326–28 (1990); Donald C. Langevoort, Behavioral Theories of Judgment and 
Decision Making in Legal Scholarship: A Literature Review, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1499, 
1503 (1998); Dan Simon, A Third View of the Black Box: Cognitive Coherence in Legal 
Decision Making, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 511 (2004); see generally Symposium, The Legal 
Implications of Psychology: Human Behavior, Behavioral Economics, and the Law, 51 
VAND. L. REV. 1495 (1998).  For a discussion of the impact of this model of cognitive 
psychology on law in the larger context of the contest between rationalist and 
nonrationalist pictures of human cognition and psychology, see Anne C. Dailey, Striving 
for Rationality: Reviewing Open Minded: Working Out the Logic of the Soul, 86 VA. L.
REV. 349, 383 nn.124–25 (2000). 
18. On the influence of romanticism and the significance of the debate between
rationalism and romanticism for law, see Dailey, supra note 17, at 380–89.  See also
Nomi Maya Stolzenberg, Liberalism in a Romantic State, 5 LAW, CULTURE & HUMAN. 
194, 195–201, 204–05, 214–15 (2009) [hereinafter Stolzenberg, Romantic State]; Nomi
Maya Stolzenberg, Liberalism in Love, 28 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 593 (2010) [hereinafter
Stolzenberg, Love].  On the intertwining of religion and romanticism, see SUZANNE R.
KIRSCHNER, THE RELIGIOUS AND ROMANTIC ORIGINS OF PSYCHOANALYSIS 150–57 
(1996). 
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religious belief is depicted as “blind” or described as being insulated
from ordinary standards of evidence.19 
That ambivalence bespeaks the importance of the unresolved tension 
between rationalist and romanticist understandings of the nature of belief 
to the way we conceptualize religion and the religious conscience.  The
ambivalence concerning whether beliefs are the products, or the foils, of 
reason is particularly pronounced in modern-day liberal secular discourse. 
It is commonplace among those who fashion themselves as secular
liberals today to distinguish religious from nonreligious beliefs precisely
on the grounds of the former’s ostensible opposition, or resistance, to 
reason.20  And this understanding is not wholly without merit; people of
faith also distinguish faith from reason and elevate the former over the 
latter, though for them the irreducibility of faith to reason is not a badge 
of shame.21 But the distinction drawn between faith and reason is
seriously misleading if it is taken to imply either a lack of affinity 
between religious beliefs and rationalism, or a perfect affinity between
reason and secular or “scientific” beliefs.22  Even if the core of religion 
involves a “leap of faith,” religious beliefs are also, like other cognitive 
beliefs, products of the exercise of the faculty of human reason, and
religious thought has often embraced one or another form of rationalism.
Contrariwise, the uncritical view of secular science that sees it as the 
purely rational antithesis of presumptively irrational religious belief has 
19. See Leiter, supra note 2, at 944–45.  The divergence between conceptions of
the conscience that view conscientious beliefs as “all things considered, deliberative 
judgments of our own reason” and other conceptions that dispute the role of reason in 
producing the “promptings” of conscience is discussed in Thomas E. Hill Jr., Four 
Conceptions of Conscience, in INTEGRITY AND CONSCIENCE, supra note 9, at 13, 28. 
20. See SAM HARRIS, LETTER TO A CHRISTIAN NATION 62–79 (2006); CHRISTOPHER
HITCHENS, GOD IS NOT GREAT: HOW RELIGION POISONS EVERYTHING 63–71 (2007);
DAVID HUME, AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, reprinted in  THE 
PORTABLE ATHEIST: ESSENTIAL READINGS FOR THE NONBELIEVER 33–34, 44–45 (Christopher 
Hitchens ed., 2007); VICTOR J. STENGER, GOD: THE FAILED HYPOTHESIS: HOW SCIENCE
SHOWS THAT GOD DOES NOT EXIST 22 (2007); STEVEN WEINBERG, DREAMS OF A FINAL 
THEORY, reprinted in THE PORTABLE ATHEIST: ESSENTIAL READINGS FOR THE NONBELIEVER, 
supra, 374–79. 
21. Accord  JEREMY WALDRON, GOD, LOCKE, AND EQUALITY: CHRISTIAN 
FOUNDATIONS OF JOHN LOCKE’S POLITICAL THOUGHT 102 (2002) (discussing Locke’s 
religiously grounded views, including the belief “that there were certain elements of 
morality which are just not accessible to reason in the ordinary way”). 
22. On the historic affinity between religion and rationalism, see Stolzenberg, 
Romantic State, supra note 18, at 196, 204–05, 209.  See generally Stolzenberg, Love, 
supra note 18.  On the imperfect affinity between science and a strictly rationalist 
conception of belief formation, see STEVEN SHAPIN, A SOCIAL HISTORY OF TRUTH: 
CIVILITY AND SCIENCE IN SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND 22–27 (1994); STEPHEN
SHAPIN, NEVER PURE 367–69 (2010). 
1048
STOLZENBERG FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 12/6/2010 8:47 AM     
   































   
 
   
[VOL. 47:  1041, 2010] Theses on Secularism
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
been succeeded by a more sophisticated awareness that all beliefs rest on 
faculties apart from pure reason, including secular and scientific ones. 
Religion’s relationship to reason is thus a good deal more complicated
than simplistic distinctions between faith and reason, religion and science,
make out.  And just as secular science may fail to meet the stringent 
standards of pure reason, religion may embrace, rather than repudiate,
rationalism and reason.
It bears emphasis that rationalism has been a central feature of all of 
the religious traditions that have influenced modern liberal political 
thought.23  All of the religious traditions from which the lineage of Western 
political thought descends have traditionally embraced a distinctively
rationalist conception of human psychology and morality, according to 
23. See generally Nomi Stolzenberg, The Profanity of Law, in  LAW AND THE
SACRED (Austin Sarat et al. eds., 2007) (discussing the influence of rationalism on
religious traditions that have influenced modern liberal political thought, in particular 
Christianity and Judaism) [hereinafter Stolzenberg, The Profanity of Law]; see also
Stolzenberg, Romantic State, supra note 18, at 196, 200, 203.  Discussions of rationalist 
traditions of thought within Christianity, the religious tradition that most directly
influenced the development of Western political philosophy, are extensive.  They tend to
begin with the Thomistic synthesis of faith and reason, and include consideration of the 
rationalist traditions in Judaism and in Islam, the latter of which provided the conduit 
through which classical philosophy entered into contact with Christian and Jewish
thought.  See, e.g., HERMANN COHEN, ETHICS OF MAIMONIDES (Almut Sh. Bruckstein
trans., 2004); MAJID FAKHRY, A HISTORY OF ISLAMIC PHILOSPHY (3d ed. 2004); JULIUS
GUTTMANN, PHILOSOPHIES OF JUDAISM: THE HISTORY OF JEWISH PHILOSOPHY FROM
BIBLICAL TIMES TO FRANZ ROSENZWEIG (David W. Silverman trans., 1964); 1 HISTORY 
OF ISLAMIC PHILOSOPHY (Seyyed Hossein Nasr & Oliver Leaman eds., 1996); MOSES
MAIMONIDES, 1 THE GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED (Shlomo Pines trans., 1963).  On the 
rationalist strain in Locke’s Christian thinking, see WALDRON, supra note 21, at 25
(quoting JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 162 (Peter Laslett ed.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690) (“God makes [man] in his own Image after his own 
Likeness, makes him an intellectual Creature, and so capable of Dominion.”)), and 94– 
107 (discussing further Locke’s rationalist theology).  The fact that religious traditions 
have influenced secular theories of liberalism itself bears emphasis.  Indeed, as a matter
of intellectual genealogy, the political theory of liberalism derives from traditional
theological conceptions of persons and politics—and rationalism.  On the derivation of
liberalism from religious thought, see WALDRON, supra note 21, at 102–05.  See also
JOHN DUNN, THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF JOHN LOCKE: AN HISTORICAL ACCOUNT OF THE
ARGUMENT OF THE TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 262–67 (1969); Nomi M. Stolzenberg 
& Gideon Yaffe, Waldron’s Locke and Locke’s Waldron: A Review of Jeremy Waldron’s 
God, Locke, and Equality, 49 INQUIRY 186, 202, 205 (2006).  On the religious roots of 
modern political thought more generally, see CHARLES TAYLOR, A SECULAR AGE 159–61
(2007). 
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which religious faith is a product of free will and the faculty of reason.24 
Free will, on this traditional conception, is viewed as being governed by, 
or subject to, human reason.25  Far from being an invention of the secular
Enlightenment, rationalism thus formed the basis of most traditional,
premodern views of psychology.  On this traditional view, the “lower” 
faculties of the human psyche—the drives, the passions, the appetites— 
need to be “governed” by the “higher” faculty of reason, whose task it is 
to discern the transcendent moral law and to guide human behavior—and
belief—accordingly.26  Such was the theological proposition underlying the
Protestant doctrine of Christian liberty, according to which faith cannot
be forced but has to be the product of a volitional exercise of a person’s
own inward reason.27  Such also was the theological position of the
Catholic Church, crystallized in the Thomist synthesis of faith and
reason.28  And such was the view of moral psychology shared by any 
number of both religious and nonreligious premodern theories concerning
the proper relationship between the state and the individual, all of which 
viewed beliefs as at least in part the product of the volitional exercise of
reason—an inward faculty of the mind—which in turn led to a 
recognition of the need to respect the free exercise of reason as a central
problem, if not necessarily a desideratum, of political theory.29 
The notion of conscience is manifestly connected to this rationalist 
tradition, as evidenced by the frequent designation of freedom of
conscience—whether specifically religious or not—as an “intellectual
freedom,” in other words, a freedom of the cognitive mind.30 
24. This is not to say that the rationalist view of faith as a product of free will and
reason was the only view that prevailed within these religious traditions.  To be sure
there were nonrationalist and antirationalist conceptions of faith and belief formation
within these faith traditions as well.
25. See  GIDEON YAFFE, LIBERTY WORTH THE NAME: LOCKE ON FREE AGENCY 66 
(2000). 
26. See Stolzenberg, Romantic State, supra note 18, at 209–10 and sources cited 
therein. 
27. On the Protestant doctrine of Christian liberty, see Michael W. McConnell, 
Old Liberalism, New Liberalism, and People of Faith, in  CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES ON
LEGAL THOUGHT 5, 15 (Michael W. McConnell et al. eds., 2001).  Although he does not 
emphasize their theological foundations, Beiner’s analysis of Hobbes, Spinoza, and 
Locke similarly highlights the centrality of this view of faith as a product of individual 
reason in the political thought of each of these three thinkers.  See Beiner, supra note 2,
at 1109; accord WALDRON, supra note 21, at 102–03. 
28. The literature on the synthesis of faith and reason in the Thomistic tradition is 
vast. 
29. See supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
30. See, e.g., Am. Commc’ns Ass’n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 442 (1950) (Jackson, 
J., concurring and dissenting) (“Intellectual freedom means the right to re-examine much 
that has been long taken for granted.”); Ezra Heywood, Commencement Address at
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Conceptualizing the conscience as an intellectual or cognitive rather than 
an affective faculty is related to the choice between thinking of the 
conscience (or religious belief more generally) as a matter of religious or 
moral knowledge, or rather as species of “blind faith.”  Of course, both 
views have a place in our thinking about religion; the tension between
them remains unresolved.  The important point here is that the view that 
religious belief is solely a matter of blind faith, impervious to reason, is 
itself blind to the long tradition of association between religious faith
and rationalism and the view that religious beliefs are at least in part— 
important part—a product of the exercise of human reason. 
The rationalist strand of traditional religious thought is linked to 
another important feature of the traditional idea of conscience—its
connection to the moral law.  The task of reason, according to the
traditional moral psychology, is, as stated above, to discern the moral
law.  To be sure, theologians questioned whether reason alone could 
discern the moral law and most contended that faith was a necessary
auxiliary to reason.  More precisely—putting aside the more extreme 
fideist positions, according to which reason was an enemy of faith and 
faith alone could show “the way”—most traditional religious thinkers 
contended that reason was a necessary auxiliary to faith.31  But even  
when faith was distinguished from and elevated above reason, mainstream 
theologians, both Catholic and Protestant, commonly held that reason
was a necessary, noble, and important faculty of the human psyche, 
whose special task it was to perceive and follow the moral law.  (How 
widely distributed the faculty of reason is was a separate question.)  The 
two notions of submitting the lower faculties of the human psyche to the 
governance of human reason, and of exercising one’s reason in order to 
Brown University: Milton: The Advocate of Intellectual Freedom (1856), cited in DAVID
M. RABBAN, FREE SPEECH IN ITS FORGOTTEN YEARS 32 (1997); Sean Murphy, Freedom 
of Conscience and the Needs of the Patient, PROTECTION OF CONSCIENCE PROJECT, 
http://www.consciencelaws.org/issues-ethical/ethical023.html (last visited Oct. 26, 2010)
(“The first, and traditional view, is that conscience is an intellectual faculty that judges 
whether an act is morally good or evil.”); see also Stolzenberg, Jiminy Cricket: A
Commentary, supra note 9, at 54, 58. 
31. To hold, as traditional theology did, that the task of the faculty of reason is to 
discern the moral law—and that reason is therefore necessary—is not necessarily to hold 
that reason is sufficient to the task.  Cf.  YAFFE, supra note 25, at 65–69 (attributing to 
Locke the view that reason, although necessary, is insufficient and must be supplemented
by revelation, and that “[w]hile revelation might not be indispensable in principle, it is 
indispensable in fact”).
 1051









              
 
 
      
 
 
   
 
 







subject one’s behavior to the guidance of the moral law, are two sides of 
the same notion, inward reason being but the subjective correlate of the
objective moral law on the traditional conception.32 
The notion of conscience, which derives from traditional rationalist 
moral psychology and hence subscribes to the twin notions of the moral 
law and reason, is thus both rationalist and what we might call legalist in 
nature—“legalist” in the sense that it imagines the conscience as speaking 
to us in the form of “dictates,” commandments, negative or positive 
behavioral injunctions, religiously sanctioned obligations, privileges, and
permissions—in a word, laws.  Conscience, then, as it has traditionally been
conceived, is legal or law-like in both substance and form.  This legal 
character is intimately connected to the underlying rationalism of the 
dominant model of religion.  
Together, the legalist and rationalist aspects of the traditional model of 
religion as conscience are responsible for many of the conundrums of 
contemporary free exercise jurisprudence noted in the other conference
papers.  One problem with viewing religion solely as a matter of conscience 
and viewing conscience as an expression of beliefs or judgments about 
what the moral law requires is that not all religions take the form
of religiously prescribed moral commandments and obligations.  Some
religious traditions are more law-like—more given to moral
pronouncements and behavioral injunctions—than others.  And, as has 
been noted, even religious traditions that are very law-like are not
exhausted by the articulation of legal or moral commandments and
obligations.33  They make other kinds of claims as well.  Religions also
do many other things, quite aside from making claims of any sort.  For 
example, many religions cultivate states of spiritual “awareness”—not 
the same thing as conscious propositional belief. Religions also
customarily generate a general cosmological orientation—again, not the
same thing as a propositional belief, nor precisely the same thing as 
spiritual “awareness.”  Some religions prescribe a particular spiritual 
32. Here we can see how the rationalist/irrationalist dichotomy links up with the
dichotomy between a transcendental realm of objective morality and a subjective mental 
realm mired in the material human brain. 
33. Cf. Koppelman, supra note 2, at 963–64 (“The emphasis on conscience focuses 
excessively on duty, which is only a small part of religious motivation.  Many and 
perhaps most people engage in religious practice out of habit; adherence to custom; a 
need to cope with misfortune, injustice, temptation, and guilt; curiosity about religious 
truth; a desire to feel connected to God; or happy religious enthusiasm, rather than a 
sense of duty prescribed by sacred texts or fear of divine punishment.”); see also id. at 
973 (describing reasons given by Catholics for participating in the custom of attending 
Mass other than the belief that it is religiously required).
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discipline or regimen.  Some generate particular cultural identities and a 
sense of belonging and attachment to a particular group, expressed in 
culturally specific traditions and customs and affiliations.  Religions give 
people somewhere to go and something to do, a way to structure their
life-cycle events and to number their days.  In short, religions do all 
kinds of things besides issuing law-like, or even non-law-like, claims. 
The coexistence within some faith traditions of nonobligatory customs 
with obligatory laws is just one case in point.34  The existence of 
religious beliefs concerned with neither custom nor law but rather with 
“ultimate” questions of “meaning” or “reality” is another.35  The general 
point is that there are many things that religions do besides articulate
commandments, injunctions, permissions and prohibitions, and other 
more or less law-like dictates.
The dominant tendency—which is to equate religion with beliefs in 
the existence of law-like commandments about what is morally
permitted or required—has increasingly come under fire, as critics of 
that model pose questions that open up to an ever-widening circle of
beliefs and practices that might be counted as matters of conscience
worthy of protection, accommodation, or separation from the state. 
Why, such critics ask, should religious propositions about nonmoral 
matters such as the nature and the origins of the universe be any less
respected than religious propositions about what forms of human conduct 
are morally prohibited or mandated?  Why should nonreligiously based
views about what is morally required be treated any differently than 
religious ones?  Why should religious customs be any more vulnerable 
to state prohibition—or any less separated from the practice of
statecraft—than actual commandments?
For that matter, what is the basis for protecting the paradigm case, the 
right to follow religious commandments?  Here, as others have shown, 
the problems multiply.  From the standpoint of the believers in a 
34. A good illustration of the difference between claims rooted in duties mandated 
by religious law and claims rooted in religious custom is provided in Goldman v. 
Weinberger, in which the right claimed—that of a Jewish military chaplain to be able to 
wear a yarmulke or head covering notwithstanding military regulations proscribing the 
wearing of headgear—concerns a practice rooted in custom not a duty prescribed by
Jewish law.  Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 509–10 (1986), superseded by 
statute, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989, Pub L. No.
100-180, 101 Stat. 1019 (1987), as recognized in Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 
(2005). 
35. Cf. Perry, supra note 7, at 996–98. 
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religiously prescribed commandment, the multiple bases for protecting
their right to act in accord with it are clear: it is commanded, it is the
moral thing to do, it would be immoral to do otherwise, and the
consequences of violating the commandment—eternal damnation or 
other forms of punishment expected to be meted out for violating the
commandment—are likely catastrophic.  But none of these beliefs can
be the state’s basis for allowing the believers to follow their conscience
for the simple reason that they are the believers’ religious beliefs (and
therefore it would violate the basic principle of the separation of church
and state for the courts or legislature to adopt them).  Either the state has 
to be making a purely pragmatic, prudential judgment about the futility 
of enforcing a law against believers’ objections—the idea being that, 
from a deterrence point of view, conscientious objectors will never be 
deterred by state-prescribed punishments if they perceive the negative 
consequences of violating their consciences to be significantly greater
than the negative consequences of violating state law.  Or, as some of 
the language of the conscientious objector cases suggests, the state is 
basing its decision on the subjective psychological suffering that would 
be caused if the believers believe that they will go to hell or otherwise be 
subject to terrifying divine punishment. 
Alternatively, the suffering recognized as a basis for exempting
religious believers from legal obligations that contravene their religious 
beliefs might be the anxiety that believers experience if they believe that
their failure to discharge their religious obligations will cause others 
unacceptable harm.36  Either way, if psychological suffering is the basis 
for the court’s or the state’s decision to grant an exemption to
conscientious objectors, then it is hard to see why it matters whether
their emotional anguish results from acting in ways that violate their 
religious beliefs as opposed to their nonreligious moral beliefs—or why
it matters that emotional suffering results from violating moral beliefs or 
beliefs of any kind.  Emotional suffering can result from being required 
to follow laws to which one objects for reasons quite independent of 
one’s beliefs.  Why, then, are beliefs relevant to the decision to spare a 
person emotional suffering that results from following the law?  And
why, more particularly, are beliefs in the existence of moral commandments
relevant when emotional suffering can result from being forced to
comply with the law of the state, regardless of the existence of a belief in
36. See Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 344 (1970) (extending exemption 
from draft to people “whose consciences, spurred by deeply held moral, ethical, or 
religious beliefs, would give them no rest or peace if they allowed themselves to become
a part of an instrument of war”). 
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the existence of a moral commandment prohibiting such compliance? 
People can suffer just as much from acting in ways that violate their 
sense of the cosmos or ultimate meaning—or their own interests.
Likewise, suffering can result from being prevented from passing on
one’s cultural identity to one’s children.  Even when there is no religious 
law commanding them to respect the order of the cosmos or to 
contemplate the meaning of the universe or to pass on their heritage to 
their children, people often suffer when laws require them to act in ways
that violate their sense of religious order.37 
The slippery slope and line-drawing problems associated with this line 
of questioning are well-known.38  I do not mean to rehearse them here. 
The point is rather to point up the distinctively legal form of the beliefs 
that are typically imagined to motivate or constitute the religious or 
nonreligious conscience.  It is not only that beliefs constitute the central 
protected category.  It is not only that religious belief is seen as
essentially cognitive or creedal in nature—with religion imagined as a 
set of intellectual propositions about the content of the divine moral law, 
itself regarded as a metaphysical truth, which each individual is free to
affirm or deny in the light of her own reason.  It is also that this 
metaphysical truth is assumed to express itself solely or chiefly in the
form of commandments and obligations, coupled with the existence of a 
divine legislator or divine source from which those obligations flow. 
The quintessentially legal form that conscientious beliefs assume follows
from the fact that conscientious beliefs are, by definition, beliefs about 
the propositional content of moral law.  As such, they are more aptly
regarded as a species of moral knowledge than as the species of feeling
connoted by terms like blind faith.  Like “blind love,” faith that is 
“blind” eclipses rational thought.  By contrast, the law-like character
imputed to conscience partakes of the rationalist side of the rationalist-
romanticist dichotomy.  But then this means that the conscience model
37. Cf. Perry, supra note 7, at 1001 (“[D]enying religious or moral freedom to 
people—freedom to live their lives in harmony with their religious or moral convictions 
and commitments—is hurtful to them, sometimes greatly hurtful.  The hurt consists of 
the suffering that attends the experienced disintegration of a central aspect of their lives:
they are legally prevented from living their lives in harmony with one or more of their
core convictions and commitments; in that sense, and to that extent, they are legally
prevented from living their lives in harmony with themselves.”).
38. See White, supra note 3, at 1089 (discussing the “slippery slope” produced by
the adoption of a “subjective and psychological approach”); Smith, supra note 5, at 336– 
37. 
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of religion excludes from its ambit all those religious traditions, beliefs,
practices, and forms of awareness that do not take the rationalist form of 
a law-like code of commandments in which one consciously affirms 
one’s belief.
This exclusion of non-law-like religion from the ambit of constitutional
protection is one of the chief problems confronted by a liberal jurisprudence 
of tolerance and religious freedom.  The exclusion raises the question of 
whether an ostensibly secular government can live up to its basic
obligation of avoiding religious favoritism while protecting the free exercise
of all religions (subject, of course, to appropriate, universally applied 
limitations.)39 More generally it raises questions about the meaning of
secularism and the nature of the connection between secularism and the 
idea of religion as conscience. 
(4) It is often mistakenly thought that the idea of secularism was born 
in modern times with the decline of traditional religion and the concomitant 
“disenchantment” of the world.  In fact, the traditional moral psychology
embedded in Christian theology was linked not only to rationalism but 
also to a conception of secularism.40  The conscience model of religion
cannot be fully understood without appreciating the background 
conception of secularism against which it operates and how that background 
conception has changed over time. 
To repeat, the traditional moral psychology embedded in Christian 
theology, discussed above, was linked not only to a conception of
rationalism but also to a conception of secularism.  Indeed, it was by 
virtue of its commitment to rationalism that the tradition of Christian 
theology that we are discussing embraced a conception of secularism
and the necessity—and virtue—of secular politics.  The particular 
conception of secularism that issued from this distinctively religious 
understanding of the capacity—and limits—of human reason formed the 
basis of premodern as well as early modern theories of political
sovereignty and state law.41 
Because of its grounding in religious theology, I have suggested that
we call this conception of secularism and secular government 
“theological secularism” or “secularist theology”—a notion that sounds
paradoxical to modern ears only because of the profound changes that
39. Perry addresses the question of appropriate limitations on the right to freedom 
of conscience, and distinguishes the existence of such limitations from denial of the 
underlying right, in his symposium contribution.  See Perry, supra note 7, at 1011–13. 
40. See Stolzenberg, The Profanity of Law, supra note 23, at 42. 
41. Id.
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the original idea of secularism has undergone.42  In fact, the idea of a
realm of the secular, split off from a spiritual realm, was originally a 
religious idea, derived from the premises of religious—in particular, 
Christian43—theology.  The traditional religious conception of a division
between religious and secular realms partakes of the more basic theological
conception of a divide between the heavenly realm of the spirit and the 
earthly realm of matter.  From this standpoint, all mortal doings,
including the exercise of reason, are subject to the limitations of the
material world.  It follows that reason is highly fallible—we are prone to 
be mistaken in our individual and collective judgments about our moral 
rights and obligations as we are prone to be mistaken about every truth 
proposition, regardless of whether it concerns the realm of physical or
metaphysical reality. 
Fallibilism, the doctrine that states that human beings are prone to 
error and, more particularly, that human reason is prone to error, is 
intimately related to—and is in fact a product of—the quintessential
religious belief: the belief in the existence of God, who alone is possessed 
of perfect knowledge.  God is all-knowing; we are not.  This is the 
fundamental religious insight that ultimately led to the embrace of 
virtually all of the doctrines that we associate today with liberal secularism.
The traditional theological argument for secularism—and that there was 
a traditional theological argument for secular law and government bears 
repeated emphasis—began with the proposition that, notwithstanding the 
fact that human beings are possessed with the faculty of reason—a belief
that is itself a product of the religious doctrine of the imago dei, 
according to which we are all created in the image of God and, by virtue
of that, possessed with the divine spark of reason—that divine spark
permits us to discern God and his moral law only imperfectly, precisely
because it is embedded in the material world. 
This recognition of the imperfection of human reason, and the more 
general imperfection of the human and larger material world, drove 
some devout Christians, and people of other faiths with similar doctrines 
of fallibilism, to embrace doctrines of political quietism, which ostensibly 
renounced politics in pursuit of a withdrawal from worldly affairs. 
Ironically, such quietist doctrines invariably necessitate the assumption
of precisely the powers of worldly government and law from which they
42. Id. at 43. 
43. Id. at 42. 
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seek to escape.44  More significantly, though, for purposes of the analysis 
here, such quietist doctrines were never the dominant political theory
within Christian thought.  Instead, most theologians and religious believers 
drew the opposite conclusion from the same religious understanding:
that human structures of governance needed to be established and law 
needed to be implemented by the state through the exercise of human
reason, imperfect though it was.  Indeed, the dominant theological view 
was that the establishment and implementation of human government 
and law through the exercise of reason were not just morally and 
practically necessary but also (by virtue of that necessity) divinely
ordained.
In order to appreciate the distinctively secular character of state 
politics and law that this traditional theological viewpoint gives rise to, it
is important to follow its basic line of argument, which proceeds from 
positive postulates about human beings’ potential to follow the moral 
law to negative postulates about human beings’ potential for evil as well 
as the fallibility of reason back to more positive postulates about human
reason and the project of human governance.  This back-and-forth
oscillation between optimism and pessimism about human nature bespeaks 
a distinctive—and distinctively religious—attitude toward human
government, an attitude that is neither overly optimistic, nor overly 
pessimistic, but rather a cautious blend of optimism and pessimism about 
the capacity for human beings to govern justly.  Optimism, based on the
human capacity for reason, is chastened by the awareness of the 
fallibility of reason and the human capacity for innocent error as well as 
evil.  As we shall see, this religiously fostered awareness was, ironically, 
directly linked to an appreciation of the inherently secular, profane
character of the political project. 
A rough outline of the theological argument for secular politics goes 
like this: God has prescribed the moral law; this law is sacred; it 
emanates from and dwells within the transcendental realm of the spirit.
Human beings, in the earthly material world, the temporal realm, are 
subject to that law.  In the afterlife, they will meet their just deserts:
44. With David N. Myers, I explore this paradoxical phenomenon of the 
emergence of highly politicized forms of religion out of religious commitments to
political quietism in our ongoing work on Kiryas Joel, an ultra-orthodox Jewish 
community, which, in the name of separatism and political quietism and withdrawal 
from the realm of “earthly power,” has established its own municipal institutions and 
become ever more deeply engaged with the levels of political power at every level of
U.S. government. See David N. Myers & Nomi M. Stolzenberg, Rethinking 
Secularization Theory: The Case of the Hasidic Public Square, AJS PERSPECTIVES
(forthcoming 2011). 
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eternal punishment or eternal salvation as the case may be.  God is thus 
not only the divine legislator; he is also the divine law enforcer.  The 
problem is how, or even whether, to enforce the moral law in the
temporal world.  
The problem is complex: not only is there the problem of people who 
willfully violate the moral law, there also is the problem of people who 
genuinely mean to follow—and enforce—the moral law but whose 
cognitive imperfection prevents them from doing so without error.  The 
first problem, more conventionally known as the problem of evil, is what 
we may refer to more directly and simply as “the bad guy problem.” 
The second problem, known conventionally as the problem of knowledge, 
is more of a “good guy problem.”  Deriving from the fallibility of reason
and the cognitive limitations of the material brain, unlike the bad guy 
problem, which results from acting on the human inclination to do evil 
things in violation of the moral law, it afflicts even those who are 
sincerely trying to conform to the moral law (but are simply mistaken
about what the moral law requires).   
Unless one draws the extreme quietist conclusion that only God can 
and should enforce the moral law, the project of human governance is 
necessitated by the bad guy problem.  The basic idea here, contra
quietism, is that it cannot be God’s will for human beings to have to 
endure the commission of crimes and other moral violations with impunity
while  they are here on this mortal earth.  The  function of human
government, on this view, is thus to carry out God’s moral law.  And if
the theological argument for earthly politics stopped there, it would—as 
many modern-day secularists charge—imply a theocratic model of
politics.  But⎯and this is the key point⎯the traditional religious argument 
for politics does not stop there.  Resisting the quietist alternative to
theocratic politics—no politics—it moves on from the bad guy problem, 
which, quietist doctrine aside, necessitates human law and government,
to the good guy problem, which prevents human beings from being able
to enforce the moral law without error. 
Others have noted the existence within religious faith traditions of a 
well-founded distrust of the government’s ability to discern or determine 
moral truth, a distrust rooted in the same problem of knowledge that we 
are discussing here.45  But it is important to realize that the limitations of
45. See Perry, supra note 7, at 1008. 
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the government’s ability to discern the truth extend not only to
identifying what the moral truth is but also to applying the moral law to 
particular cases.  Furthermore, the same inherent cognitive limitations
that impair the ability of the government to apply sacred law to
particular cases impair its ability correctly to apply any body of law to 
particular cases, be it positive or moral, secular or sacred.  The 
religiously inspired understanding, enshrined in centuries of theological 
thought, is that positive law cannot be sacred precisely because of the
cognitive fallibility of every putative law enforcer.  In recognition of 
this, the good guy problem, the sacred law pictured in the biblical 
tradition combines the substantive principles of moral law, composed of 
various religious-moral injunctions and obligations, with a procedural
law that is designed to curb erroneous judgments and the consequent 
miscarriages of justice.  The substantive sacred law is addressed to the
bad guy problem: it tells people what not to do.  The procedural part of 
the sacred law is addressed to the good guy problem: it tells the people 
who claim to be enforcing the sacred, moral law, including those who 
sincerely—conscientiously—believe that they are enforcing God’s law,
that they have to be mindful that they may be mistaken.  And in
recognition of that ever-present risk of human error, biblical law articulates
procedural requirements that are designed to prevent erroneous judgments 
from being rendered.  Indeed, the procedural requirements articulated in
biblical law are so stringent that they make it virtually impossible to
secure a conviction.46 
At this point we reach the first pessimistic turn in the theological
argument for secularism.47  This is precisely the point at which other 
theological interpretations renounce worldly politics altogether and
retreat to a position of extreme quietism and skepticism.  The line of
argument that we are pursuing resists such extreme skepticism in favor
of a more moderate skepticism, which permits it to turn back toward a 
cautiously optimistic perspective, which ultimately combines moderate 
skepticism with an equally moderate, chastened faith in reason and
government.  This distinctive attitude, a complex blend of trust and 
distrust, motivates an embrace of worldly politics that coexists with the 
recognition that power may run amok, and therefore worldly politics 
needs to be subjected to moral constraints.  Thus, the line of argument 
that we are pursuing simultaneously recognizes the need for worldly
46. See Stolzenberg, The Profanity of Law, supra note 23, at 41–43. 
47. See Nomi M. Stolzenberg, Taking Blessings Seriously: A Comment on Ronald
R. Garet’s “To Secure the Blessings,” USC Law Legal Studies Paper No. 10-17 (2010), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1681558. 
1060
STOLZENBERG FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 12/6/2010 8:47 AM     
   









      
     
  















[VOL. 47:  1041, 2010] Theses on Secularism
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
government and positive law, rooted in the need to protect the good guys
from the bad guys, while remaining mindful that, even when run by the
good guys, government, like all people and human institutions, lacks the 
cognitive equipment necessary to ensure that the implementation of 
positive law will always conform to the moral law.48 
It is in precisely this sense that positive law is understood, on the 
traditional theological account we are tracing here, to be inherently
secular as opposed to sacred.  If government adhered consistently to the 
sacred law, it would be bound by the stringent procedural requirements 
built into the sacred law that make it effectively unenforceable, except 
by God.  In other words, effective government would be impossible. 
Positive law is thus defined in the first instance by the relaxation of these 
impossibly stringent procedural requirements, which permits the
machinery of law enforcement to go forward. That relaxation makes it
inevitable that, far from implementing the sacred law, positive law is 
bound on occasion to violate it.  Positive law is thus precisely not sacred
law.  It is, in this precise sense, secular law. It is profane.49  It requires
getting one’s hands dirty.  The people tasked with its implementation 
therefore must be secular, rather than spiritual, figures. 
None of this means that positive law is not divinely ordained.  On the 
contrary, according to the traditional theological conception that we are 
outlining, it is God’s will that there should be secular rulers charged with
the dirty task of enforcing the law.50  The law of the sovereign is
nonetheless regarded as authorized by God’s law even as it is understood to
be secular in the precise sense that it will deviate from—and on occasion
violate—sacred law’s procedural and substantive requirements.  The
sovereign’s law is understood to be secular in the additional sense that, 
despite good faith efforts to discern the content of the transcendental
moral law and conform positive law to it, it will emanate from the minds 
of human beings and not from God; it is further understood to emanate 
not from religious authorities—human beings charged with special 
knowledge of God’s way⎯but rather from secular authorities, human
beings charged with the separate business of governing temporal affairs.
But even though it is well understood that these rulers will inevitably
have dirty hands, which is precisely what it means for rule to be secular,
48. Id.
49. See Stolzenberg, The Profanity of Law, supra note 23, at 30. 
50. See id. at 41–42. 
 1061
STOLZENBERG FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 12/6/2010 8:47 AM     
 
 










     
 
 









    
 
    










that is, mired in the material world, the law of the sovereign is
nevertheless regarded as authorized by God’s law.  It is God’s law that 
demands the creation of a sphere of secular law and politics separated
from the sphere of religious authority.  Indeed, it is precisely because of
law’s inherently secular, profane nature that God’s law demands the
separation of religious and political authority.
This is the distinctively religious vision of secularism and the need for 
secular government that I call theological secularism.51  It obviously 
differs from the understanding of secularism that prevails today, which 
is, we might say, a secularized understanding of secularism from which
any religious content or grounding, or religious authorization, has been
emptied out.52 
(5) This traditional religious conception of the need to separate
religion from politics has recently been recuperated in a number of
important writings that posit the “institutional” view of separation
between religion and the state.53  According to this view, the purpose of
the Establishment Clause, and the broader principle of separation 
between church and state, is to protect the autonomy of religious
institutions—prototypically, the Catholic Church54—as against a more
individualistic conception of the purpose as being to protect the
individual’s freedom of conscience.  The old theological view of church-
51. See id. at 41. 
52. Cf. Steven D. Smith, Separation and the “Secular”: Reconstructing the 
Disestablishment Decision, 67 TEX. L. REV. 955 (1989) (comparing the premodern 
understanding of “the secular” as a sphere of human activity entailed by religious principles 
and encompassed by religious dogma to the modern notion of “the secular” as the
dichotomous opposite of “the religious”); see also Steven D. Smith, How Is America 
‘Divided By God’?, 27 MISS. C. L. REV. 141, 150 (2007) (explaining that many
religionists “favor maintaining a secular public sphere,” and describing a variety of 
traditional religious theories of secular government); Steven D. Smith, Recovering (from) 
Enlightenment?, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1263, 1276–77 (2004) (describing the religious 
character of much Enlightenment discourse in which “the assumption of an overarching 
[sacred] normative order was entirely compatible with the Enlightenment concept of 
reason”); Steven D. Smith, Separation and the Fanatic, 85 VA. L. REV. 213, 223 (1999)
(reviewing TIMOTHY L. HALL, SEPARATING CHURCH AND STATE: ROGER WILLIAMS AND
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY (1998)) (discussing Roger Williams’s idea of a civil sphere “firmly
grounded in religious rationale”); Steven D. Smith, The “Secular,” the “Religious,” and
the “Moral”: What Are We Talking About?, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 487, 502–03
(2001) (explaining that “for the devout, ‘religion’ is the name of the encompassing city
within which the ‘secular’ is a contained neighborhood”). 
53. See generally Richard W. Garnett, A Hands-Off Approach to Religious 
Doctrine: What Are We Talking About?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 837 (2009) (analyzing
the hands-off “rule” and its application in the courts); Smith, supra note 5; White, supra
note 3, at 1091–93, 1087, 1100–01. 
54. See White, supra note 3, at 1098, 1102–03. 
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state separation is thus presented as a theoretical alternative to the
modern liberal idea of freedom of conscience.
The institutional conception stands as an important correction to the 
individualist bias of modern conceptions of religion and law.  That 
individualist bias is exhibited in many features of the model of religion 
that we have been discussing.  Perhaps the most obvious manifestation 
of the way in which religion as conscience is committed to an 
individualist approach to rights is its dependency on the distinction,
noted above, between the inner realm of human subjectivity, the psyche,
and an outer realm of human behavior and experience.  In legal doctrine 
and in the broader public, the inward-outward distinction is often
articulated in terms of the distinction between practice and belief.  There 
is, however, an ambiguity in the usage of the term belief, which
complicates and in some ways undermines the inward-outward, belief-
practice distinction.  More often than not, the term belief has reference to 
the “interiority” of the human mind.  Regardless of whether the “seat” of
the psyche that holds or forms beliefs is imagined in rationalist terms, as 
the head or the cognitive mind or, in more romantic terms, as the heart, 
the libido, or the spirit, belief, on this commonplace view, is understood 
to dwell within the mind of a single individual.
This notion that beliefs reside within the individual has to be contrasted
with the equally commonplace idea of “belief systems” that constitute 
and differentiate human cultures.  An idea derived from the modern
discipline of cultural anthropology, roughly synonymous with the
anthropological idea of “culture,” belief system has primary reference to
outward forms, symbols, social practices, activities, and institutions in 
which a culture’s values, attitudes, and beliefs are embodied.  Belief 
systems exist not only, or primarily, in the mind of the individual but 
rather in the external realm of social practice. They thus have an
“objective” existence that is independent, or more precisely, outside, of 
any individual’s inward beliefs.   
This is not to deny the intimate connections between an individual’s 
inward beliefs and the beliefs embodied in the external culture.  Indeed, 
connections run both ways, with outward actions and social practices
and institutions “expressing” people’s subjective beliefs, and people 
forming their subjective beliefs through a process of cultural norm 
“internalization.”  But, quite apart from the gaps that can exist between
an individual’s subjective beliefs and the beliefs embodied in the 
surrounding culture, even when there is no gap, there remains an 
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important conceptual and practical difference between beliefs as they are 
manifested in the external world of social relations and cultural
institutions—belief systems—and the beliefs to which an individual
actually subscribes, which may or may not accord with the external
belief system.  Even the most cynical account of the faculty of the 
conscience, which views it as nothing but the internalization of societal
norms,55 bespeaks a recognition of the interiority of the human mind that
is in some sense separate from, even if determined by, the outward realm 
of human experience.  What, after all, could it mean for norms to be 
“internalized” were there not an inner psychological realm distinguishable
from the realm of outward social action? 
There is thus an important ambiguity in the usage of the term belief.  
Sometimes the beliefs protected under a doctrine of freedom of religion
or freedom of conscience are the belief systems that unite people as
cultural collectivities, give them a distinct sense of cultural identity and 
belonging, and instill in them a felt need to engage in certain kinds of 
practices, activities, and rituals as an expression of who they are.  Other 
times, the reference is to the beliefs that dwell within the mind of the 
individual, beliefs that may be oppositional to, or simply different from, 
the beliefs embodied in the surrounding culture and its belief systems. 
Typically, religious freedom doctrine finesses this distinction between a
cultural belief system and the subjective beliefs to which an individual 
actually subscribes. But the prevailing model’s commitment to
individualism and the consequent devaluation of the social and the 
practical, including the outward realm of culture in which belief systems 
are materialized, is quite clear. Religion as conscience draws a 
distinction drawn between an inward realm of subjective psychological 
belief and the outward realm of external physical and social experience.
More to the point, it privileges the former over the latter.  In so doing, it 
simultaneously privileges the individual over the social and privileges
belief, or theory, over practice. To put it otherwise, it privileges
individual belief over belief systems.  Hence the perceived tension 
between the “institutional” conception of the religion clauses, which
would confer autonomy on churches and other religious associations, 
and an individualistic conception, concerned with protecting the
individual’s freedom of belief. 
55. See Hill, Four Conceptions of Conscience, in INTEGRITY AND CONSCIENCE, 
supra note 9, at 21–22 (describing what he refers to as the “extreme cultural relativist 
conception” of conscience, according to which the conscience is nothing but the
internalization of a given set of cultural norms). 
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There is good reason to be concerned that the model of religion as 
conscience, which relies on the basic distinction between practice and
belief, privileging the latter over the former, threatens to give short shrift
to religious practices and institutions. But it is more than “practice” as
that term is ordinarily understood that falls outside the definitional ambit 
of that model.  It is possible, after all, to make the case for protecting 
religious practices that are “grounded in” religious beliefs.  The idea of a 
right to freedom of conscience can indeed be interpreted as encompassing 
the right to live in accordance with one’s beliefs, as others have 
proposed.56  But then the only practices that will receive protection are 
ones that can be traced to a religious sanction in which the believer believes.
In other words, this argument for protecting religious practices, or
analogous nonreligious moral practices, is ultimately rooted in the same 
legalist conception of religious belief as the argument for protecting
belief.  Absent a showing of a religious commandment in which the 
believer believes, or at least some authorizing “custom,” there is no 
warrant, on the conscience model, for protecting religious practices. 
Thus, the Amish would have no grounds for an exemption from the 
compulsory school laws unless they could produce evidence of the
“existence,” in their religious tradition, of a religious law commanding 
them to keep their teenage children out of school—or commanding them 
to transmit their traditional way of life to their children.  Likewise, the 
plaintiffs in Mozert57 could not honestly claim that secular humanist 
education interferes with their free exercise of religion unless they could 
prove that they believed in the existence of a religious law commanding
them to insulate their children from exposure to “secular humanist” 
ideas.  And so on.  In any given case, the plaintiffs might be able to satisfy 
the requirement of demonstrating the existence of a religious commandment, 
injunction, or obligation prescribing the practice for which protection is
sought.  But this seems to miss the point of cases like Yoder58 that
recognize the value of preserving a religious “way of life” as a value in 
its own right.
(6) The problem goes beyond giving short shrift to religious or 
cultural practices that cannot be referred to a particular religious
commandment enjoining their performance.  There are also aspects of
 56. Perry, supra note 7, at 996, 1011–13. 
57. Mozert v. Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987). 
58. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
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religion that go beyond either inward belief or outward practice. 
Attitudes, for example, are neither practices nor precisely beliefs, though 
they may be expressed in practices and informed by beliefs. In some
religions, the cultivation of certain attitudes is just as important as the 
adoption of certain beliefs or the performance or avoidance of certain
actions.  Indeed, there are religions in which the cultivation of a certain
attitude is more important than either belief or practice.  Like thoughts, 
feelings, and inward beliefs, attitudes dwell in our individual psyches. 
Yet we also speak meaningfully about “cultural attitudes.”  Like 
conduct, cultural attitudes pertain to the outward realm of the social, the 
cultural, the collective; they are external to the individual psyche in 
much the same way that a practice or an institution is external.  
Yet attitudes are not precisely beliefs.  And they certainly are not
practices, notwithstanding their outward cultural manifestations.  Yet,
like practices that cannot be tethered to protected beliefs, spiritual attitudes 
are liable to escape the ambit of protection of the dominant model
because they are neither beliefs in the existence of divinely ordained law
nor practices enjoined by such law.  Religious attitudes, and the practices 
devoted to their cultivation, thus join religious social institutions, 
religious ways of life, and religious belief systems that are embedded in 
cultural institutions and social practices as manifestations of religious 
life that fall outside the definitional ambit of the dominant conscience-
based model of religion.  Like those more obviously cultural or
communitarian forms of religion, religious attitudes are yet another 
casualty of the individualist bias against the social. 
(7) Needless to say, the adoption of a model of religion that excludes
such communitarian or cultural conceptions and forms of religion 
reflects a bias in favor of what was historically the dominant religion. 
To be more specific, the conscience model is a product of the 
historically dominant Christian faith—more specifically, it is a product 
of the particular forms of Protestantism that flourished in America and, 
until quite recently, dominated American political and legal culture.  The 
inherent individualism, as against more social conceptions of religion;
the legalism, with religion pictured as a code of behavior expressed in
the form of moral injunctions; the subjectivism and the focus on the 
inner psychological life of the individual, in particular the individual’s 
cognitive beliefs concerning the existence and the content of the moral
law; the implicit rationalism, albeit rationalism of a particularly
moralistic kind—all of these are features of the religious tradition that 
was historically dominant in the English and American societies out of 
which our contemporary legal culture derives, and they demonstrate the 
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ongoing influence of a certain strain of Protestantism on the doctrine of 
freedom of conscience.59 
(8) Taking stock, the exclusions that are most readily observed fall
into the domain of the social and the practical as against the domain of
individual mental interiority.  Social practices are commonly accorded a
lesser level of protection or not protected at all under the historically
dominant model of religious freedom precisely because they are external 
to the protected realm of belief and conscience.  Even when the case is
made for protecting religious practice on the grounds that there is an 
interest in living one’s life in accord with one’s beliefs, beliefs remain
primary and social practice secondary.  The practice has to be demonstrated
to be required in some meaningful sense by one’s beliefs.  Without any 
such authorizing beliefs, the case for protecting social forms of life in 
the name of religious freedom or tolerance falls by the wayside. 
But, if we recognize that “[a]ll social life is essentially practical”60 
and if we further recognize that not all practices and social institutions 
are undergirded by authorizing beliefs—at least not in the legalistic 
sense demanded by the conscience model of religion—then it becomes 
clear that one important consequence of adhering to the conscience
model of religion is that many religious practices and institutions will go
un- or under-protected.61 To put it otherwise, religions that are more
concerned with practice than with individual belief—religions that 
express themselves in the form of institutions and cultural belief systems 
with which people identify for reasons other than creedal belief—will 
receive less recognition than those religions that conform to the
prevailing individualist model of conscience⎯unless of course, as is
often the case, nonconforming religions survive by adapting to the 
prevailing model.62 
59. See  WITTE, supra note 2, at 39–42; accord White, supra note 3, at 1075–76. 
On the individualist bias of religion clause jurisprudence, see GEDICKS, supra note 1, at 
12–13; Ronald R. Garet, Communality and Existence: The Rights of Groups, 56 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1001, 1007 (1983).  But see 2 KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGION AND THE
CONSTITUTION: ESTABLISHMENT AND FAIRNESS 436 (2008) (arguing against Gedicks’s 
view that Supreme Court jurisprudence is necessarily beholden to a secular individualist
theory to the exclusion of the recognition of more communitarian values).
 60. Karl Marx, Theses on Feuerbach, in 1 THE GERMAN IDEOLOGY 121, 122 (C.J. 
Arthur ed., 1970). 
61. But see Koppelman, supra note 2, at 978–79. 
62. On Judaism’s adaptation to mainstream American cultural norms and the 
dominant Protestant model of religion, see generally STEVEN M. COHEN & ARNOLD M.
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(9) In addition to the outward—social and practical—aspects of 
religious life that fall out of the model because they cannot be reduced to
the requisite sort of belief, there are inward religious experiences that
likewise cannot be reduced to belief and therefore may fail to be 
recognized by the dominant model.  As discussed above, attitudes are 
one important kind of inner psychological state not reducible to conscious 
cognition or propositional knowledge.  (The complex attitude discussed
above of cautious skepticism and cautious faith in reason and government 
cultivated by the theology of secularism is just one example of an
attitude cultivated by religious faith traditions.)  Although such cultural 
attitudes in a certain sense “exist” in the external cultural realm, just as 
other aspects of belief systems do, they are also internalized into the psyche.
And insofar as they are, they represent a species of inward psychological 
experience that, although seeming to conform to the individualist model 
of religion in being located within the individual’s mind, does not 
conform to the model’s insistence on the presentation to the mind of 
consciously held propositional beliefs.   
Yet another example of inner mental states that escape the terms of the 
belief-practice dichotomy are those commonly referred to as states of
religious or spiritual “awareness,” or what some non-Western traditions 
call “mindfulness.”  For example, the attitude, discussed above, of tempered
optimism, characteristic of theological secularism, was fostered by a
certain kind of spiritual awareness—to wit, the awareness of God’s
unique perfection and human fallibility. This is more than a matter of 
holding a certain set of propositional beliefs, conscious or otherwise. 
Belief in God’s perfection and human imperfection stems from a sense 
of divinity, an intuition of the existence of a world beyond the material 
world that surpasses conscious mind even as it informs conscious beliefs.
Or such, anyway, is some people’s reported experience.  The awareness of
cosmic oneness, or of human nothingness, or of a transcendent spirit or 
realm of being—these are other examples of particular forms of spiritual
awareness that certain religious traditions cultivate.  Such states of
awareness may be coupled with beliefs, but they are not reducible to
them.  They may even be, in some important sense, prior to or constitutive
of the beliefs with which they are associated.  Indeed, a religious 
awareness of a certain kind may be critical to maintaining certain beliefs 
with the result that, when the awareness is lost, the beliefs crumble.
EISEN, THE JEW WITHIN: SELF, FAMILY, AND COMMUNITY IN AMERICA (2000); and 
ARNOLD M. EISEN, THE CHOSEN PEOPLE IN AMERICA: A STUDY IN JEWISH RELIGIOUS
IDEOLOGY (1983). 
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Alternatively, awareness may be directed at dissolving propositional 
beliefs and the minded ego that holds them.  Awareness of all of these
varieties is an inner psychological state but one that does not necessarily
take the form of “holding” propositional beliefs. Indeed, it need not be a 
conscious state at all. 
Many religious traditions take seriously the project of cultivating 
conscious or even unconscious psychological states, such as spiritual
awareness.  The belief-practice dichotomy that underlies the model of
religious conscience not only privileges inner religious experiences over
outward ones and in so doing promotes individualism over theories of 
social solidarity; it further privileges conscious inner experiences— 
specifically, cognitive beliefs about moral law—over attitudes and states 
of awareness that, while essential to our practices and beliefs, are not 
reducible to them.  The worries about the exclusionary consequences of 
a model of religion as conscience thus extend beyond concerns about the 
failure to recognize the obviously social dimensions of religion, such as 
culture, institutions, and practice, to encompass concerns about the 
exclusion of certain inward spiritual states from the model as well. 
This exclusion from the dominant model of religion of inward mental 
states that do not involve conscious cognition and the affirmation of 
propositional beliefs may seem at first blush to be disconnected from the 
individualist bias against the social, practical, and institutional dimensions
of religion.  After all, inward mental states, regardless of whether they
are cognitive or noncognitive, seem to reside within the individual, making 
it difficult to see how the exclusion of nonpropositional, noncognitive 
mental states could be expressive of the dominant model’s commitment
to individualism.  But there may well be a communal dimension to the 
inner “awarenesses,” attitudes, and cosmological “orientations” excluded
from the cognitivist model of religion.  Consider that the most common
noncognitive inner states of spiritual awareness and mindfulness cultivated
by religious faith traditions are ones that are said to “transport” the
individual beyond himself.  These are the states of spiritual transportation 
characteristically promoted by mystical (in other words, nonrationalist) 
forms of religion.  In these mystical states, the individual is said to achieve
a sort of cosmic union or sense of communion in which the boundaries 
established by ordinary sense perception are dissolved. 
But if what such “inner” psychological states involve is a mystical or
spiritual connection—be it with humanity, with God, with nature, or 
with the cosmos—then their exclusion from the dominant model’s
 1069








   
 
     
    
   
 
 












definition of religion is actually of a piece with the model’s individualist 
bias against experiences of sociality.  The semantic links between
“communion” and “community” are suggestive of a profound connection
between spiritual experiences of unity—communion—and social
experiences of solidarity—community or “communism” in the root 
sense of the word⎯that goes beyond the merely semantic.  Like external 
manifestations of community that take place in the material world of 
social practice and cultural institutions, the inward state of spiritual 
communion and “oneness” with the universe is a form of experience in
which the sense of one’s individuality, prized in liberal culture,
dissolves.63 
(10) The question that remains is how the dominant model of 
conscience, with its emphasis on individual cognition and moral law, 
relates to the notion of the secular to which our liberal polity is 
ostensibly committed.  Obviously, the contemporary understanding of 
secularism and the requirements of secular government vis-à-vis religion 
is very different from the theological conception of secularism
elaborated above.  Indeed, from the standpoint of today’s understanding
of secularism, theological secularism is oxymoronic.  Secular political
authority is not supposed to be authorized by divine law on the
contemporary understanding.  Divinely ordained government is supposed
by contemporary secular thought to be tantamount to a theocracy in
which religious law, applied by religious authorities, rules.  But the 
divinely ordained government of secularist theology is precisely not a
theocracy.  Secularist theology authorizes not rule by religious authorities 
but rather rule by secular authorities.  The spheres of religious authority 
and secular political authority are supposed to be kept separate according 
to theological secularism.  Yet, both are authorized by sacred law, as
indeed is the separation between political/secular and religious jurisdictions.  
The traditional conception of secularism is thus radically different from 
the modern conception of secularism and the division of religious and
secular jurisdictions, according to which the authority of secular
government is supposed to be entirely independent of religious authority
or belief. 
(11) The standpoint of the old secularism is religious; the standpoint 
of the new secularism is—ostensibly—nonreligious.  From the standpoint
of the old secularism, the secularism of the new secularism has been, as 
63. Here one wonders what connection there might be between such social and
spiritual experiences of communion and the original meaning of conscience, as knowing 
in common?  White, supra note 3, at 1076–77. 
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it were, secularized—emptied out of religious content.64  The pressing 
question, for both the secular and the religious, is how we moved from 
the old secularism to the new one, and what was gained—and what was
lost—when we did so.  More particularly, what are the implications for 
the policies of religious freedom and conscience of moving from one 
conception of secularism to the other? 
From the standpoint of the old secularism, we are always strangers in 
a secular land.  If secular is defined not as that that is void of religious 
content and authority but rather as that that pertains to the affairs of the 
temporal, material world, then the world is per se secular, as are
all “worldly affairs.”  The former definition represents the modern
understanding of secular; the latter is the viewpoint of premodern— 
theological—secularism, a concept that, it should by now be clear, is no 
oxymoron.
What was seen very clearly from the traditional standpoint of
secularist theology is that the temporal world’s secularism consists in 
nothing more or less than its (necessary) estrangement from the sacred.
The conditions of the material world—our physical needs, the “burdens of
judgment,” our “fallen” nature—practically ensure that it, or more
precisely, we, will fail to live up to the requirements of sacred law.  The 
violations of sacred law that are endemic to material life are an integral
aspect of the original meaning of the secular.  On this understanding,
political authority is, by its very nature, secular, and therefore estranged
from the sacred whether its inherent secularity is acknowledged or not.
It should by now be clear that the theological justification for the
establishment of secular political authority that grew out of this
understanding of the unholy condition of existence in the material world 
is grounded in the logic of the state of emergency.  Adumbrating the 
emergency theory of political sovereignty recuperated in Carl Schmitt’s 
controversial work on “political theology,” the theological texts that
articulated the doctrines of theological secularism explicitly describe the
institution of government and effective mechanisms of law enforcement 
as an assumption of emergency powers necessitated by a state of
emergency.65  All of the hallmarks of a Schmittian state of exception are 
present in this traditional theological conception of secular political rule:
64. Cf. Smith, supra note 5 (discussing the emptying out of religious content from 
the concept of the secular).
65. See Stolzenberg, The Profanity of Law, supra note 23, at 48–49. 
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the institution of effective government that involves a suspension of the 
rule of law (that is, the sacred law that guarantees the inviolable rights of 
liberty and life) coupled with the explanation that their suspension      
is necessitated by the conditions of emergency.  Without effective 
mechanisms of law enforcement within the temporal world, the
explanation goes, people can commit crimes and other moral violations
with impunity.  In other words, there is a “bad guy problem.”  There is 
no way to protect people from such rampant violence without violating
the sacred law whose stringent procedural rules will inevitably be violated
by erroneous convictions and miscarriages of justice.  This, of course, is
the “good guy problem.”  Notwithstanding the good guy problem— 
the problem of miscarriages of justice and erroneous convictions owing to
the inevitable limitations of human judgment that the doctrine of 
fallibilism records—the conditions of emergency that would result from
the absence of any effective law enforcement—the bad guy problem
again—necessitate the establishment of a government with the power to 
enforce the law. 
The bad guy problem, in other words, is just another way of
describing the state of emergency.  The good guy problem is another
way of expressing the acknowledgment that effective responses to such a 
state of emergency—effective law-enforcement mechanisms—inevitably
carry the risk of miscarriages of justice, which is to say, violations of the 
(sacred) rule of law.  Yet sacred law itself, the law that recognizes the 
inviolability of human life and liberty, is what requires—and justifies— 
the suspension of the sacred law.  In other words, all secular law is
emergency law, by definition.  Furthermore, the emergency is never 
going to end because the emergency conditions that necessitate the 
institution of secular government and deviations from the strict procedures
of the sacred law stem from the inherent condition of the secular mortal
world.  The emergency, in other words, is permanent (within the bounds 
of secular time).  The matter is life.  There is no possibility of restoring 
the sacred law in earthly time or space.
It is for this complex set of reasons that, on the traditional theological
understanding, the realm of the sacred must remain separate from the 
jurisdiction of the secular.  And by the same token, the secular must
remain estranged from the sacred.  What sets the traditional religious, 
theological understanding of the principle of church-state separation 
apart from the contemporary nonreligious view is the recognition that
wherever we are in this mortal world, we are in a secular, hence
strange⎯estranged⎯land.  Even Christians in Christendom, even Jews 
in the “Jewish Commonwealth” of Israel, are, on the traditional religious 
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understanding, in a secular land because a commonwealth, or system of
human political rule is, by definition, secular.  Wherever we are in this 
mortal world, we are always in a secular land, living under a political 
order defined by the conditions of emergency that result from the
imperfect conditions of mortal life.  Those conditions estrange us from 
the realm of the sacred, but they also estrange us from the realm of the 
secular insofar as we have any intimation of the realm of the spirit, 
making us everywhere and always strangers in a secular land.66  The  
essential function of religion, from this perspective, is to maintain our 
awareness, our consciousness, our mindfulness of this condition of
estrangement from a realm of existence (divinity) that transcends the
fallen condition of the material world. 
The “institutional” conception of church-state separation is a dim echo
of this ancient religious conception of secularism.  A number of scholars 
are laboring now to revive it.  But how can a principle of institutional 
autonomy be defended against a conception of individual freedom of 
belief in a world where the religious belief that authorized both religious
and secular jurisdictions has been almost entirely lost?  How can the idea
of institutional or jurisdictional separation be adapted to a society in 
which the individualist ideal of intellectual freedom and a secularized
understanding of secularism hold sway?  In addition to what was gained, 
what was lost when we moved from the old understanding of secularism
to the new one?  How can we remember that we are always “strangers in
a secular land” without the old theology to cultivate the requisite spiritual 
awareness?  Is it possible to sustain that awareness of being strangers in
a strange land⎯of being a part but not fully a part of this world, of there 
being something within us that transcends this world⎯without religion?
What are the consequences of losing that (spiritual?) awareness that we
are always strangers in a secular land?  And what are the implications of 
this loss of awareness for our understanding of, and policies toward,
conscience?  In our modern-day secular world, we cannot even begin to 
answer these essential questions until we have reconstituted an awareness of
our essential condition of estrangement either by recuperating the old 
way of thinking about secularism or by constructing a new one, in which
these questions can again make sense.
66. Cf.  ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, PASSION: AN ESSAY ON PERSONALITY
(1984). 
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